When Prime Minister Narendra Modi first visited Israel in 2017, he broke new diplomatic ground as the first Indian Prime Minister to undertake a standalone bilateral trip to the Jewish state. That visit symbolised the culmination of a long, gradual shift in India’s West Asia policy — from hesitation and distance to open strategic engagement. His recent second visit, however, comes at a far more turbulent moment. With the United States and Israel intensifying military actions against Iran, the regional atmosphere is charged. The timing of the visit inevitably raises difficult questions: Has India tilted too far? Has it compromised its traditional non-alignment? Or is this simply the continuation of a post–Cold War strategic recalibration?

The issue of timing is central. High-level diplomacy never occurs in isolation. Modi’s visit took place against the backdrop of escalating confrontation between Israel and Iran — including targeted killings and retaliatory strikes that have unsettled West Asia’s fragile equilibrium. Critics argue that India’s visible proximity to Israel at such a moment signals alignment. They contend that New Delhi, long seen as a balancing power maintaining cordial ties with both Tehran and Tel Aviv, risks being perceived as choosing sides.

Yet such criticism often rests on an outdated understanding of India’s foreign policy doctrine. Classical non-alignment emerged during the Cold War’s rigid bipolarity. It was designed for a world divided between Washington and Moscow. That world ended in 1991. The collapse of the Soviet Union forced India to rethink its external engagement. Economic liberalisation, strategic vulnerability, and the search for technological and defence partnerships compelled a pragmatic turn.

The decisive shift came under Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, who established full diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992. This was not an impulsive move but a calculated response to a transformed global order. India sought stronger ties with the United States, access to advanced defence technology, and diversified partnerships in West Asia. Recognition of Israel marked the beginning of an open relationship that had previously existed quietly beneath the surface.

The relationship deepened further during the tenure of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The 2003 visit of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to India signalled that security cooperation would become central. Shared threat perceptions drove the convergence. India had endured repeated terrorist attacks linked to Pakistan-based groups. Israel faced persistent security challenges from both state and non-state actors. Intelligence sharing, surveillance systems, unmanned platforms, and missile defence technologies became pillars of cooperation.

By the time Modi assumed office, defence and counterterrorism ties were already robust. What changed in 2017 was political visibility. Modi’s visit elevated the partnership to a new level of transparency and confidence. Cooperation expanded beyond security into agriculture, irrigation, water management, cyber innovation, and start-up collaboration. The symbolism was powerful: India no longer felt compelled to downplay its engagement with Israel.

The second visit must be read within this trajectory of continuity rather than rupture. However, the regional context complicates perceptions. Iran remains strategically important to India. It provides connectivity access to Afghanistan and Central Asia, particularly through the Chabahar port project. Historically, Iran has also been an energy supplier. Maintaining stable ties with Tehran serves India’s continental strategy.

Does strengthening relations with Israel undermine that balance? Not necessarily. India has consistently avoided endorsing escalatory rhetoric against Iran. It has preserved diplomatic channels and pursued connectivity cooperation even during periods of Western sanctions. Its approach reflects multi-alignment — engaging different partners on different issues based on interest rather than ideology.

The larger security context is equally significant. India continues to face cross-border terrorism and radicalisation networks. Pakistan’s record of supporting proxy groups has shaped Indian strategic thinking for decades. Technological threats, drone warfare, and cyber vulnerabilities further complicate the environment. In this context, cooperation with Israel in intelligence, counterterrorism, and advanced defence systems is seen not as ideological alignment but as operational necessity.

Moreover, India’s foreign policy today is defined by strategic autonomy, not equidistance. Autonomy does not mean abstaining from partnerships. It means retaining independent judgement. India collaborates with the United States in the Indo-Pacific, maintains legacy defence ties with Russia, engages Iran on connectivity, and deepens security cooperation with Israel — all simultaneously. This pattern reflects flexibility rather than bloc politics.

Still, optics matter. Modi’s second visit, occurring amid heightened US–Israel military actions, feeds narratives of strategic drift. Diplomacy must therefore be accompanied by careful messaging. India’s consistent calls for stability, restraint, and dialogue in West Asia are essential to preserving its image as a responsible and independent actor.

It is also important to recognise that the India–Israel relationship extends beyond security. Agricultural centres of excellence in Indian states benefit from Israeli expertise in water conservation and drip irrigation. Joint research in defence manufacturing supports India’s self-reliance initiatives. Technological cooperation strengthens innovation ecosystems. These dimensions broaden the partnership and reduce the risk of it being perceived solely through a military lens.

Ultimately, the debate over whether India has compromised non-alignment may be misplaced. India effectively moved beyond rigid non-alignment in the early 1990s. The doctrine evolved into strategic autonomy suited to a multipolar world. The current phase reflects confidence in openly pursuing partnerships aligned with national interests.

As tensions escalate across West Asia, two core questions emerge. Is this a strategic opening for India to consolidate high-technology and security partnerships that enhance its resilience? And can New Delhi safeguard its autonomy while navigating US–Israel–Iran fault lines?

The answer will depend on balance. If India continues to compartmentalise its relationships — deepening cooperation with Israel while sustaining engagement with Iran and the broader Muslim world — autonomy remains intact. If it allows perception to overtake policy substance, space for manoeuvre narrows.

So far, India’s trajectory suggests not abandonment but adaptation. It is not entering formal alliances. It is constructing layered, issue-based partnerships. In a fragmented global order, the capacity to engage competing powers without being subsumed by them may represent the most sophisticated evolution of non-alignment yet.

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