Yes—this is broadly consistent with what has been happening with HAL Tejas Mk2. Even after the project received approval from the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), several factors pushed the rollout and first-flight timelines beyond the earlier 2025 expectation.

Although the CCS approved the program, actual fund disbursement often comes in stages.

Budget allocations from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) did not always match the planned development pace. Besides the technology issues, delays in releasing funds slow prototype fabrication, subsystem procurement and supplier contracts if other elements are intact. 

This is a common issue in Indian defence programs where approval does not mean immediate full funding availability.

Typically, the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) also depends on a large ecosystem of suppliers. The key components in this case are radar, EW systems, flight control, and advanced composites. Many of these come from Indian private vendors, and some of them from global partners. 

However, the biggest, as we all know, is the engine itself. 

Is Tejas Mk2 just an upgraded Tejas—or is it practically a new aircraft? 

In this case, it will include major changes like the larger airframe, more powerful engine for higher payload capacity and longer range. Additionally, redesigned intake and fuselage and upgraded avionics architecture also consume significant time.

Integrating these systems while maintaining flight safety requires extensive ground testing and simulations, which lengthens timelines.

I put down those complexities deliberately so that the proposition and solutions don’t look like just an idea. No, the time has come for the government to consider these structural changes. Bring the structural changes and put autonomy and accountability right away. That is what the defence DPSUs need now, especially Hindustan Aeronautical Limited (HAL), in the wake of the crisis. 

Breaking HAL in two: Rotary & Fighter wing

Some of the global experience shows that very large defence contractors lead to inefficiency. One such delay is the F-35 program, led by Lockheed Martin, but the comparison with the US is non-linear. The real good and workable case is China itself, which, otherwise, with similar ecosystems, government-run large enterprises and turnaround for tech, and production. 

China originally had one giant aerospace monopoly: Aviation Industries of China.

The system became slow, bureaucratic, and inefficient.

In 1999, the government split it into two competing firms: Aviation Industry Corporation I and China Aviation Industry Corporation II.

The 1999 China reform: splitting the aerospace giant

In 1999, the Chinese government divided the conglomerate into two competing companies: Aviation Industry Corporation I and China Aviation Industry Corporation II.

The idea was “managed competition.” Each company received different factories, research institutes, and aircraft programs.

And how were programs split? Fighter aircraft institutes in one group; Trainer and helicopter institutes in the other; and Component manufacturing distributed across both. Factories and research institutes were divided between them.

So, two corporations competed for military contracts from the PLA, which forced better cost control, faster development cycles and stronger project accountability. 

So, what were the results of the split?

The competition helped modernise China’s aerospace sector. During the 2000s, China rapidly developed aircraft such as the Chengdu J-10, Shenyang J-11, and Harbin Z-10 helicopter. 

Crucially, the factories and design bureaus became more specialised and performance-driven. It built a competitive design institute that develops stronger integration with private players.

However, after the industry became stronger, China remerged the two companies in 2008 to reduce duplication. This structure allowed China to develop advanced aircraft such as the Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter and COMAC C919 passenger jet. 

Balancing national security and efficiency

While I don’t support the phase wise reforms as the case with Ordnance Factory Board (OFBs), turning in to DPSUs. That worked only a bit, nothing great or new breakthroughs came out so far, except they began to export. 

Splitting HAL carries risks too so, it could be in the form of incremental reforms. It could be a phase-wise Restructuring: Start by corporatizing HAL’s helicopter division, then replicate successes.

At the same time, invest in workforce and partner with institutions like IITs and global aerospace institutions to upskill HAL engineers in AI, computational fluid and design and development dynamics. It could add drone technologies too.

Several structural factors contribute as defence acquisitions often take 5–7 years between RFP and contract signing. Along with multiple approval layers in the Ministry of Defence’s decisions. However, in recent Draft DAP 2025, Government has been very forthcoming on bringing change, efficiency. That is good things as we acknowledge the systemic malaise and then try to resolve.  

Overdependence on a single DPSU in such a critical sector is risky. Historically, HAL handled design, production, and upgrades. This created capacity bottlenecks, especially when HAL had to manage Tejas Mk1A production, Sukhoi upgrades, helicopters and engine integration programs.

The painful part, India still lacks an indigenous fighter-class turbofan. General Electric (GE) F404 Tejas Mk1/1A is slow in delivery but fine at the moment. But for Tejas Mk2 / AMCA Mk1, GE F414 is not fine as long it becomes a matter of cat and mouse game.

Lately, talks with French engine makers Safran has progressed but blueprint is still missing. Another key global jet engine manufacturer Rolls-Royce has pitched in too. As I remember the words of Indian Air Force (IAF)’s deputy Chief Air Marshal Bharti during my discussion, “Intent must be solid and good.”  A point is made here for the government to how to go about, but faster. 

5th-gen fighters require technologies India is still scaling up for stealth shaping, internal weapons bays, advanced AESA radar, sensor fusion all based on super cruise-capable engines.

What the government can do to fix?

Split HAL into separate design and manufacturing companies. Create two competing aerospace primes instead of one monopoly. Allow private firms like Tata Advanced Systems, Larsen & Toubro, and Mahindra Aerospace to compete for aircraft production.

Keep R&D with agencies like Aeronautical Development Agency for the development.

Use competition to improve speed, accountability, and innovation.

The Ministry of Defence has started structural reforms, involving the private sector. Instead of giving AMCA fully to HAL, the Production may involve private firms like, Tata Advanced Systems, Larsen & Toubro, Mahindra Aerospace.

So, the goal must straight forward and simple: reduce monopoly bottlenecks and increase manufacturing speed. According to Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh, the target is 5–6 years from RFP to contract.

Thrust on fighters — autonomous Tejas inc.

Instead of waiting for AMCA to mature, Tejas Mk2 will act as a technology bridge, may be a mature fighter itself.  So, the Tejas is the foundational, what will it validate is crucial in terms of new sensors, advanced composites, larger airframe design, improved avionics and upgraded EW systems. Those technologies feed into AMCA development.

The best: Could there be an autonomous Tejas subsidiary within the HAL? 

The aerospace is too critical. Fixing it will herald the real structural changes as India is trying to fix three systemic problems at once.

Even though AMCA may involve private industry, HAL is still critical. Building a Tejas Inc. will be the thrust that is needed within the HAL’s boundary. Here, MoD can even allow private players to take stake in Tejas Inc.

For the planned expansion includes New Tejas production line in Nashik (2025) where HAL is Targeting 24 aircraft/year. Combined with the Bengaluru line, total Tejas output could reach 30–36 jets annually.

That matters because the IAF’s current woes on fighter squadron shortage is lingering. 

The reforms as mentioned— HAL’s structural changes, Tejas Inc., private sector involvement, faster procurement, and parallel development—are attempts to break the cycle of decades-long delays.

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