While global attention remains fixed on the Strait of Hormuz, a quieter but strategically consequential development is unfolding in the Western Pacific. The United States, the Philippines, Australia, Japan, and several other partners recently conducted the large-scale Balikatan military exercise in the Philippines, while China launched counter-exercises on the Pacific side of the archipelago. These parallel moves highlight an intensifying strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific, one increasingly defined not just by alliances but by integrated military networks and coordinated deterrence.

This year’s Balikatan marks a turning point, particularly because of Japan’s unprecedented level of participation. For the first time, Tokyo has deployed around 1,400 personnel, including command-level elements from all three services of its Self-Defense Forces. Japan has also deployed Type 88 surface-to-ship missiles with a range of 150–200 km. Given that the distance between the northern Philippines and Taiwan is roughly 350 km, coordinated deployment of such systems across allied forces could place key maritime corridors under overlapping missile coverage. If extended-range systems, such as Japan’s newer long-range missiles, are introduced, the coverage expands across much of the First Island Chain. This reflects a broader doctrinal shift: Balikatan is evolving into a platform for networked deterrence, where allied forces integrate targeting, surveillance, and long-range strike capabilities. The presence of joint headquarters personnel enables real-time coordination, particularly in linking missile systems, while US deployments such as 150-200km range NMESIS missiles reinforce the move toward a distributed but interconnected denial architecture.

From China’s perspective, these developments complicate its operational environment. The ability of the People’s Liberation Army Navy to project power into the Pacific depends on crossing the First Island Chain, yet a network of coordinated missile systems, distributed across Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, raises the risks of such movement. China’s counter-exercises in the Pacific can therefore be understood as both a demonstration of capability and a signal of resolve against this emerging deterrence framework.

Although India is not formally part of Balikatan, its role in this evolving security environment is becoming increasingly significant. The Philippines’ acquisition of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, with a range of around 290 km, represents a major enhancement of coastal defense and fits directly into the broader pattern of maritime denial emerging across the region. In this sense, India is already contributing to the same strategic architecture, even without direct participation in the exercise. Its role is that of a capability provider, particularly in missile systems and defense technology, which are central to the emerging deterrence network.

Beyond missile exports, India’s presence is gradually extending into other domains. Reports of Indian involvement in Taiwan’s indigenous submarine programme, as well as its expanding defense partnerships across Southeast Asia, indicate a widening strategic footprint. It describes this broader trend as a shift toward “networked” or “minilateral” security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, where many powers collaborate flexibly to balance China rather than relying solely on formal alliances. Within this framework, India’s growing engagement complements the activities of US allies and partners in the Western Pacific.

In this evolving environment, India-Japan cooperation is becoming increasingly central. What began as political alignment around the idea of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific is gradually transforming into concrete military and technological collaboration. Joint projects such as the UNICORN naval communication system illustrate a shift toward interoperability and shared defence infrastructure. At the same time, both countries are investing in similar capability areas, including naval ships (now, Japan will suggest Mogami class frigates), fighter jets, unmanned systems, missile technologies, systems for maritime domain awareness, and planes and helicopters, cyber systems etc creating strong potential for deeper cooperation.

Looking ahead, the logic of this partnership is likely to push cooperation into more advanced domains. India’s experience with systems like BrahMos and Japan’s development of long-range strike capabilities suggest possible future coordination or even joint development in missile technologies. Both countries are also expanding their focus on drones and autonomous systems, which are critical for surveillance and distributed maritime operations. In addition, naval cooperation, particularly in undersea warfare and anti-submarine capabilities, could become increasingly important given China’s expanding naval presence. These areas of collaboration are not hypothetical; they reflect structural convergence in strategic interests and capability development.

Taken together, these developments suggest that the Indo-Pacific is moving toward a distributed deterrence architecture, in which multiple states contribute complementary capabilities to maintain regional balance. Japan provides advanced technology and forward deployment along the First Island Chain, India contributes missile systems and strategic depth, Southeast Asian states such as the Philippines serve as key geographic nodes, and the United States acts as an integrator of these networks. Within this system, India-Japan cooperation functions as a crucial connective layer linking the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific.

As early as 2007, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe stated in the Indian Parliament that “a strong India is in the best interest of Japan, and a strong Japan is in the best interest of India.” Current developments suggest that this idea is no longer simply a diplomatic aspiration. The convergence of strategic interests, combined with expanding cooperation in maritime security, defence technology, and missile capabilities, indicates that India-Japan relations are entering a more operational phase. In the context of evolving exercises like Balikatan and the broader Indo-Pacific competition, this partnership is becoming not just relevant but structurally important to the regional security order.

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