Yet the verdict is layered. Jamaat-e-Islami’s strong performance—securing 68 seats—signals the persistence, if not resurgence, of Islamist mobilisation in a society constitutionally committed to secular principles. The National Citizen Party (NCP), the political offspring of the uprising, managed only six seats, a reminder that street legitimacy does not automatically translate into electoral viability. Voter turnout hovering around 59-60% reflected cautious engagement in a transitional moment.
BNP campaigned under the slogan ‘Bangladesh before all’, which blends nationalism, democratic restoration, and economic revival. Its ambitious manifesto promises implementation of the July Charter’s reforms. But there is an inherent tension here. A two-thirds parliamentary majority enables swift reform but may also reduce incentives to institutionalise constraints—particularly those, such as proportional representation, that could dilute concentrated power.
On governance, the BNP has pledged a zero-tolerance anti-corruption regime, featuring transparent procurement, performance audits, repatriation of illicit financial flows, and the appointment of an ombudsman. Given Tarique Rahman’s own history of corruption allegations and prolonged exile in London, credibility will hinge on demonstrable top-down enforcement rather than rhetorical commitments.
Economically, the new govt inherits fragility. The unrest of 2024-2025 disrupted production cycles and investor confidence. Reviving the garments sector, diversifying exports, and generating nearly one million ICT jobs are central to the BNP’s recovery blueprint. It also has a broader developmental narrative aimed squarely at a restless youth constituency. Foreign policy under Rahman is likely to be recalibrated rather than revolutionised. The BNP’s articulation of an “economy-based” diplomacy suggests a more transactional posture, anchored in national interest rather than ideological affinity. Delhi-Dhaka ties had already deteriorated after Hasina’s 2024 ouster and subsequent exile in India. The BNP’s formal call for her extradition introduces an immediate diplomatic sensitivity.
Border management along the 4,000-km frontier, allegations of ‘push-ins’, and water-sharing disputes over rivers such as the Teesta and Padma are likely to test the resilience of the relationship. India’s concerns over the protection of Hindu minorities in Bangladesh will remain salient. At the same time, PM Modi’s swift outreach and Rahman’s reciprocal signals of engagement suggest that neither side is inclined toward open confrontation. The relationship may become more transactional and less emotive—but not necessarily adversarial.
China has also moved quickly to reaffirm its commitment to a “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership.” In the post-Hasina interregnum, Beijing accelerated infrastructure financing under the Belt and Road Initiative, expanded energy investments, and deepened defence cooperation. Reports of a drone production facility near the Siliguri Corridor and potential JF-17 fighter arrangements via Pakistan underscore the strategic sensitivity for Delhi. Under a BNP govt, Sino-Bangladeshi ties are likely to intensify, particularly in trade, infrastructure, and technology sectors. However, BNP appears intent on multi-alignment rather than overt tilting, maintaining functional ties with China, India, the US, and even Pakistan, while avoiding strategic overdependence.
The central challenge for Tarique Rahman is thus twofold. Domestically, he must convert a sweeping mandate into credible institutional reform without replicating the concentration of power that unseated his predecessor. Externally, he must navigate a tightening geopolitical contest in the Bay of Bengal without compromising Bangladesh’s strategic autonomy. Bangladesh stands at a moment of possibility—and peril. The electorate has repudiated authoritarianism, but the durability of democratic restoration will depend not on electoral arithmetic alone, but on institutional restraint, economic delivery, and diplomatic balance.
Pant is vice president, Observer Research Foundation
