On March 10, Tom Fletcher, the Emergency Relief Coordinator and UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, issued a high-profile call for a “humanitarian-reset” to consolidate efforts, re-evaluate strategies, eliminate redundancies, and enhance accountability across clusters and at the country level. A central part of his message was the need to accelerate the shift toward cash-based programming, aligning with long-standing commitments under the Grand Bargain.

Yet, the timing and tone of this appeal raise important questions. Many observers argue that this reset was less a bold reformist initiative and more a reaction to the recent wave of development aid cuts by the US administration and other major donors. While Mr. Fletcher referenced the grand-bargain, his statement notably sidestepped the issue of localisation, failing to outline concrete mechanisms for transferring power, resources, or leadership to local actors. This omission is particularly striking as the current iteration of the Grand Bargain is set to expire in 2026, and localisation remains one of its most contested and unfulfilled goals. As the sector approaches this critical juncture, fundamental questions emerge: Will there be a genuine reset that centres local leadership and accountability, or will it dissolve into another cycle of rhetorical commitments and fragmented reform?

The Grand Bargain Annual Meeting, held in Geneva on 16–17 October 2024, reflected these tensions. While members reaffirmed their interest in advancing quality funding, gender-transformative approaches, and strengthening national reference groups to serve as feedback loops between local and global levels, the outcomes were, by most accounts, muted and incremental. Without decisive action and structural reform, the localisation agenda risks becoming another diluted ambition, overshadowed by geopolitical shifts and institutional inertia.

The Grand Bargain (GB) was introduced in 2016 at the World Humanitarian Summit to transform the humanitarian system, with localisation as one of its core pillars. A predominant argument for localisation critiques the historical dominance of Northern development agencies and donor governments in shaping humanitarian responses. Another classical question that always generates interest is issues of resource sharing through the local actors, which generally flows from the coffers of Northern Hemisphere countries and their institutions. It has been perceived that most of the Southern Hemisphere-based actors are net receivers of the resources. Grand Bargain was embraced with optimism, viewing it as a potential game-changer.

However, the reality has proven more complex. As per the Passing the Buck report 2022, 1.2% of humanitarian funding only going directly to local and national actors till 2022. Based on the evidence, one can argue that it has fallen short of shifting power and resources to local actors in any substantive way. Questions about its legacy and next phase persist. If it ends without achieving substantial progress, the humanitarian system risks retaining the same colonial-era dynamics it sought to redress. Along the way, another question arises: Will countries and institutions in the Southern hemisphere take on new leadership roles, develop innovative funding mechanisms, and demonstrate the political will necessary to advance localisation? Alternatively, will they continue to rely on financial support from Western nations? There is a concern that existing imbalances may simply re-emerge in different forms.

One significant challenge is that many Southern countries lack national-level funding systems that can sustain local actors without depending on international aid. This creates a disconnect between the expressed support for localisation and the actual structural policies, which are often centralised, top-down, and counterproductive to the aims of localisation. This inconsistency highlights a fundamental contradiction that must be addressed for effective advancement in localisation efforts.

Let us examine a few large Southern countries that hold influence in the global humanitarian order and can change the course of localisation if they act collectively:

India

India’s development space is increasingly shaped by corporate-led social responsibility under the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) mandate of the Companies Act, 2013. While CSR has mobilised significant funds (over INR 25,000 crore in 2021-22), it operates under strict government guidelines, which restrict innovation and prioritise state-aligned objectives. Local community agency is often subsumed under state-corporate frameworks. Direct humanitarian funding mechanisms for local NGOs are virtually non-existent. Further, the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) amendments in 2020 have significantly curtailed foreign funding to local NGOs, reducing their operational independence.

China

China’s development cooperation is entirely state-led. China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), formed in 2018, coordinates China Aid, which focuses on government-to-government projects, infrastructure, and technical assistance. China’s engagement in humanitarianism has grown—e.g., through contributions to WFP, WHO, IFRC—but this rarely involves local civil society partners. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) further emphasizes large-scale corporate participation over grassroots empowerment. Domestic restrictions on NGO activity further limit the growth of an independent humanitarian civil society.

Mexico

Mexico lacks a formal humanitarian funding mechanism accessible to CSOs. The previous disaster response mechanism, FONDEN, was dissolved in 2020. Disaster and emergency responses are now managed through federal systems with minimal CSO engagement. Regulatory constraints also inhibit foreign funding to local NGOs. Despite efforts to integrate DRR into public policy, most CSOs operate in precarious environments.

Brazil

The Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC) coordinates South-South development cooperation but mainly offers technical support through state-to-state partnerships. Despite a vibrant NGO landscape, access to both national and international funding is bureaucratically arduous. The government does not maintain a grant-making mechanism for local humanitarian actors. Moreover, recent political shifts have led to reduced civic space for CSOs and public budget cuts for social development initiatives.

Nigeria

Nigeria heavily depends on foreign humanitarian aid. Currently, between 4 and 5 per cent of the operation is delivered directly through local partners, compared to 1.2 per cent globally. Most funding passes through UN agencies and INGOs. Although the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Disaster Management and Social Development (FMHADMSD) was established in 2019, its focus remains on poverty alleviation (e.g., through the National Social Investment Programme) rather than on empowering local humanitarian actors. Despite hosting many humanitarian operations in Northeast Nigeria, local NGOs are often subcontractors rather than equal partners.

Indonesia

Indonesia has a well-established disaster management framework through the BNPB (National Disaster Management Agency), but local NGOs struggle to access core funding or influence national decision-making processes. Civil society contributions are seen as complementary rather than central. International funding flows still dominate in humanitarian response efforts such as tsunamis, floods, or volcanic eruptions.

Suggestions to Improve Localisation:

Establish international humanitarian funds with Southern leadership-Governments, particularly in the Global South, should lead in establishing transparent, accessible international humanitarian funding pools that include mandatory quotas for local and national NGOs. These could be disbursed through competitive grant mechanisms, matching fund models, or simplified direct financing channels. A strategic starting point would be for a coalition of countries in the Global South—for example, India, Brazil, South Africa, Indonesia, and Nigeria—to launch a $10 billion Southern Humanitarian Solidarity Fund, focused on regional crises, protracted emergencies, and anticipatory action. Currently, less than 2% of international humanitarian funding directly reaches local actors as per the Global Humanitarian Report, 2023. A South-led pooled fund could set a precedent for reversing this imbalance.

Institutionalise local representation in national and international coordination platforms-National governments should mandate the inclusion of local NGOs, women-led groups, and community-based organizations into disaster coordination bodies such as NEMA (Nigeria), BNPB (Indonesia), and NDMA(India). Representation should be formalised in national disaster policies and linked to decision-making rights. International forums (e.g., the Grand Bargain, IASC) must also include local actors through elected representatives. Without institutional support, local actors often remain peripheral: for instance, only 3% of attendees at the 2023 Global Humanitarian Summit represented local organisations.

Transition from capacity building to capacity sharing-Rather than treating capacity building as a unidirectional process, a shift toward mutual capacity sharing is needed. This means creating South-South peer learning platforms, where local actors co-develop tools, exchange lessons from disaster response, and contribute their deep contextual knowledge. Initiatives like the Humanitarian Exchange Language (HXL) or peer-review networks across Red Cross/Red Crescent national societies offer replicable models. Studies show that “peer-to-peer learning between local responders in similar risk environments has higher retention and contextual adaptation than traditional training models” (ODI, 2022).

Promote South-South localisation alliances-Regional alliances among Global South countries—such as the African Union, ASEAN, or CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States )—should mainstream localisation within their humanitarian frameworks. These alliances can launch regional localisation funds, create civil society working groups, and host annual South-South Humanitarian Localisation Forums. The Africa Risk Capacity (ARC) provides a powerful precedent in pooling sovereign funds for disaster risk reduction and response. A 2023 FAO-WFP review highlighted that regional cooperation on humanitarian action in the Global South has doubled in the past decade but remains underfunded and donor-dependent.

Localise monitoring and accountability mechanisms-Localisation benchmarks (e.g., the 25% direct funding target from the Grand Bargain) should be monitored not just by international bodies like the IASC (Inter-Agency Standing Committee) or OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), but by national civil society coalitions and independent watchdogs. Public scorecards, community-level audits, and data disaggregation by local/national/international status can foster greater accountability and transparency.

Conclusion:

The call for a “Humanitarian Reset” invites a thoughtful reckoning with the enduring tensions within the aid system. Efforts to advance localisation cannot rely solely on international platforms, particularly when national frameworks in many parts of the Global South continue to exhibit centralising tendencies and offer limited avenues for civil society engagement. As the Grand Bargain draws to a close, the challenge lies less in formulating new pledges and more in fostering the quiet but essential shifts within donor approaches and domestic governance alike that enable a more balanced distribution of power and resources.

Real progress will depend on sustained collaboration between actors across both the Global South and traditional donor landscapes. It is through such partnerships, grounded in mutual respect and a commitment to shared responsibility, that localisation can move from aspiration to practice. Governments, donors, and civil society must work together to cultivate an environment in which the humanitarian system becomes more inclusive, responsive, and accountable to those it seeks to serve.

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