Prime Minister Narendra Modi is scheduled to visit Israel tomorrow in what is widely expected to be another landmark moment in India-Israel relations. Nearly a decade after his historic 2017 visit, which fundamentally transformed the tone and texture of bilateral engagement, this forthcoming visit carries both symbolic and substantive weight. It signals continuity, consolidation, and expansion of a partnership that has matured into one of India’s most robust strategic relationships in West Asia.

The 2017 visit was transformative not merely because it was the first standalone visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Israel, but because it marked a decisive policy shift. Prime Minister Modi de-hyphenated India’s relations with Israel and Palestine. For decades, India’s West Asia policy had been framed in a manner that linked engagement with Israel to parallel positioning on Palestine. The 2017 visit demonstrated that India could pursue an independent and interest based engagement with Israel without diluting its longstanding support for Palestinian aspirations. His address at the Knesset emphasised civilisational links, democratic values, and innovation driven partnership, while firmly rooting cooperation in shared security concerns and technological complementarities.

Importantly, de-hyphenation did not imply abandonment of principle. India continues to support a negotiated two state solution and remains committed to the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people. Recently, India participated as an observer at the Board of Peace deliberations in the United States, where it reiterated that its position on Palestine remains unchanged. India’s approach has been consistent involving support for peace, dialogue, and a just resolution of the conflict, alongside strong and independent ties with Israel. This dual commitment underscores the maturity of India’s foreign policy. It reflects strategic autonomy rather than strategic ambiguity.

Notwithstanding its principled stance on Palestine, India’s relations with Israel have grown steadily in scope and depth. Defence cooperation remains a central pillar. Israel has emerged as one of India’s most trusted partners in critical defence technologies, including air defence systems, unmanned aerial platforms, precision guided munitions, and electronic warfare capabilities. Over time, the partnership has evolved from a largely transactional dynamic to one increasingly characterised by joint research, technology sharing, and co production.

The forthcoming visit is expected to elevate this transformation further. Discussions are likely to focus on joint development of anti-ballistic missile defence systems, directed energy laser weapons, long range stand-off missiles, and next generation AI-drones. These domains represent the frontier of modern warfare and are central to India’s objective of building a technologically advanced and self-reliant defence architecture. Israel’s globally acknowledged expertise in layered air defence and battlefield innovation aligns closely with India’s expanding industrial base and its ambition to become a major defence manufacturing hub.

At the heart of this evolving framework is Mission Sudarshan Chakra, an ambitious indigenous initiative led by the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The mission seeks to establish a multi layered, AI-enabled, and networked national air defence shield by 2035. It aims to integrate advanced sensors, long range surface to air missiles under Project Kusha, anti-drone systems, cyber-resilient command networks, and space based surveillance. The objective is to protect India against complex aerial threats including hypersonic weapons, ballistic missiles, drone swarms, and hybrid attacks that combine kinetic and cyber elements.

Israel’s experience in building layered defensive architectures offers natural complementarities. Joint work on advanced interception systems, directed energy solutions, and artificial intelligence-driven battle management platforms could significantly strengthen Mission Sudarshan Chakra. A collaborative model would also deepen jointness between Indian and Israeli defence industries, allowing shared intellectual property creation, co-design of systems, and coordinated export strategies. This would reinforce India’s push for self reliance while providing Israel with industrial scale and long term production ecosystems.

The visit is also expected to situate bilateral cooperation within a broader regional and multilateral context. Israel has been strengthening its engagement with Greece and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean through structured trilateral cooperation. India has been invited to engage with this evolving framework, which is sometimes described as a broader strategic configuration linking Mediterranean and Indo-Pacific actors. In addition, there is growing discourse around a hexagonal network of partnerships that could include select Arab countries, African stakeholders, South Asian partners, Israel, India, Greece, and Cyprus.

However, India’s foreign policy tradition suggests that it would approach such a framework with nuance. India maintains a non-prescriptive policy in the region and avoids framing partnerships in sectarian terms. The explicit characterisation of any emerging arrangement as being directed against an extremist Shia-axis or a new emerging radical Sunni-axis may not align with India’s diplomatic comfort. Given India’s deep and diverse relationships across West Asia, including with Gulf countries and Iran, a sectarian framing would constrain its strategic flexibility.

A more acceptable and strategically coherent framing for India would be one that positions the hexagonal partnership against technologically-savvy non-state actors, terrorism networks, and sub-conventional threats that undermine state stability and development prospects. India itself has long been at the receiving end of non state actor adventurism and cross border terrorism. In addition, major multilateral initiatives such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) depend on secure maritime routes, stable political environments, and protection of infrastructure from asymmetric attacks. If the hexagonal configuration is conceptualised as a platform to counter terrorism, radicalism, cyber threats, and disruptive non state actors that threaten regional connectivity and economic integration, it would resonate more closely with India’s strategic outlook.

Such a functional and threat based orientation would also align with Mission Sudarshan Chakra. A multi-layered defensive shield designed to protect against drones, missile threats, and hybrid attacks has clear relevance not only for national defence but also for safeguarding infrastructure corridors, ports, energy installations, and digital networks linked to projects like IMEC. Collaboration among India, Israel, Greece, and Cyprus in these domains could create interoperable defensive technologies and shared early warning frameworks across the Indo-Mediterranean space.

The Indo-Mediterranean connection is further reinforced by economic and connectivity initiatives such as the IMEC. Connectivity corridors, energy partnerships, and supply chain integration create a strategic foundation upon which defence industrial cooperation can flourish. Discussions on advancing a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between India and Israel are also likely to gain renewed momentum. A comprehensive trade framework would facilitate defence supply chains, high technology collaboration, semiconductor cooperation, and dual use innovation flows.

Beyond defence and trade, the relationship spans agriculture, water management, cyber security, space cooperation, and innovation ecosystems. Israel’s reputation as a start up nation and India’s expanding digital infrastructure create fertile ground for joint ventures in artificial intelligence, quantum communication, and resilient infrastructure. Expanding cooperation into multilateral platforms and multi-domain engagements would enable both countries to shape emerging global norms on technology governance, counter terrorism financing, and maritime stability.

The robustness of India-Israel relations today rests on three foundations. First, political trust at the highest level has been institutionalised through regular leadership engagement. Second, defence and technology cooperation has shifted from transactional procurement to collaborative development. Third, both countries share a common concern about terrorism and the need for resilient security architectures in an era of rapid technological change.

Prime Minister Modi’s visit tomorrow must therefore be viewed not as an isolated diplomatic event but as part of a longer strategic arc that began with de-hyphenation in 2017. The ability to maintain principled support for Palestine while deepening partnership with Israel reflects India’s strategic maturity. The capacity to integrate bilateral cooperation into broader multilateral and connectivity frameworks demonstrates foresight.

If Mission Sudarshan Chakra receives structured collaborative support, if discussions on advanced defence technologies translate into joint development programmes, and if economic instruments such as a FTA complement security cooperation, the visit could mark the beginning of a new phase in Indo-Israeli relations. It would signal that the partnership is moving beyond consolidation towards innovation driven strategic integration.

In an increasingly volatile international environment marked by technological disruption and complex security threats, India and Israel have the opportunity to craft a model of cooperation rooted in democratic values, mutual respect, and shared innovation. Prime Minister Modi’s forthcoming visit embodies this opportunity. By reinforcing robust bilateral ties while upholding principled positions on regional peace, India can continue to act as a bridge builder and a force for stability. The trajectory of India-Israel relations suggests that the next chapter will be defined not only by strategic convergence but by collaborative creation of future security architectures.

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