The decision by Vietnam and the Philippines to elevate their relationship to an Enhanced Strategic Partnership during Vietnamese General Secretary and President To Lam’s state visit to Manila marks a significant geopolitical development with implications extending far beyond bilateral relations.
Coming ahead of the 50th anniversary of diplomatic ties between the two countries in July, the upgrade reflects both continuity and strategic foresight. Notably, Vietnam is now the Philippines only enhanced strategic partner in Southeast Asia, underscoring the growing importance both nations attach to each other in an increasingly uncertain regional and global environment.
The visit also highlighted Vietnam’s proactive diplomacy. Within less than a month, Lam has strengthened relations with five countries, demonstrating Hanoi’s determination to promote peace, stability, economic growth, and effective governance across the Indo-Pacific.
The word ‘Enhanced’ signals that they are upgrading cooperation in the current and non-traditional security sectors and this partnership is not against any country, particularly China. The two sides agreed to cooperate in building ‘an action plan’ to implement the new relationship framework soon for timely achievements of objectives. While the Philippines aims to achieve its goal of becoming an upper-middle-income country by 2028 and implement its development strategy through 2040, Vietnam is aiming to become high-income country by 2045.
The timing of this upgrade is noteworthy. The world is witnessing growing strategic rivalry, the declining effectiveness of multilateral institutions, the erosion of trust and increasing challenges to international law. They share the commitment to peace, stability and respect for international law as also the centrality of ASEAN. While Vietnam is highly active in ASEAN, the Philippines holds ASEAN chairmanship this year, adding to the significance of Lam’s visit.
Several agreements were signed between the two countries focusing on boosting defence, maritime operations, digital transformation and tourism. The two sides agreed to renew the 2010 Philippines-Vietnam Memorandum of Agreement on Defence Cooperation in a bid to strengthen joint capabilities in maritime security, military education, and disaster risk reduction and management. They committed to strengthen political trust, consolidate a solid strategic foundation for bilateral relations through increased high-level contacts and delegation exchanges, promote cooperative mechanisms and enhance relations across channels and between levels, sectors and localities of the two countries.
On trade, they agreed to enhance economic cooperation, bringing tangible benefits to their populations and the development of each country. They emphasised the goal of reaching a trade turnover of US$10 billion as soon as possible, reducing trade barriers, diversifying exports toward potential products, opening markets for agricultural products, including fresh fruits. They agreed to enhance cooperation into new areas such as the digital economy, green economy, blue economy, high-tech agriculture, forestry, fisheries and renewable energy. The Philippines committed to provide preferential policies and create the most favourable conditions for Vietnam’s investors.
Lam called for transformative initiatives that would make trade, investment and tourism into the principal drivers of bilateral relations. Marcos Jr. echoing this sentiment stated that the top-level summit reflected the enduring strength of the bilateral ties and their shared determination to expand cooperation across areas.
As both countries have problems with China, which is claiming about 90% of the South China Sea (SCS), they emphasised the importance of maintaining peace and stability, ensuring security, safety and freedom of aviation and overflight; resolving disputes by peaceful means based on international law; and actively coordinating with ASEAN countries to promote negotiations for an effective and substantive Code of Conduct (CoC) in the SCS that is consistent with international law, particularly UNCLOS 1982. Both countries reaffirmed their support to the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration Award.
The Philippines and Vietnam also have overlapping maritime claims in this crucial waterway and geopolitical flashpoint in the region. Despite this, the two countries conducted the first joint exercises between their coast guards in 2024. Significantly, the Joint Statement reflected their intention to resolve their maritime boundary issue peacefully.
However, both countries will have to carefully assess the implications of Xi Jinping’s recent diplomatic initiatives. First, the Global Governance Initiative announced last year, follows the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilization Initiative. While Beijing presents these frameworks as efforts to create a more equitable and inclusive international order (on the lines of the UN charter), many regional observers view them as instruments for expanding the Chinese influence.
Second, the real purpose of China’s International Organisation for Mediation (IOMed), which China claims that several countries have signed it. It is relevant to analyse what influenced Xi to propose this. China had rejected the Ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration of 2016 on the grounds that the PCA had no jurisdiction to reject its claims on maritime issues. Besides, it desired to mediate on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam dispute between three countries-Sudan, Ethiopia and Egypt. China was operating this dam and wanted to protect its interests. Since China has built or is building several dams on the Mekong River generating resentment in lower riparian states, it may have hoped that this instrument could potentially be employed to safeguard the Chinese strategic interests in disputes with them as well.
Therefore, these initiatives should be viewed within the broader context of Xi Jinping’s ambition to expand its influence and reshaping governance norms in ways that advance Beijing’s strategic interests. At a time when perceptions of fluctuating American commitment to the Indo-Pacific persist, Beijing may feel increasingly confident in advancing its strategic claims more assertively. This evolving reality will require coordinated responses from regional states that seek to preserve a rules-based order.
Against this backdrop, the elevation of ties assumes greater significance. It opens a new chapter in the relationship based on strategic trust, economic complementarity and a shared commitment to regional stability. By deepening their partnership, both countries enhance their capabilities to manage emerging challenges, seize new opportunities and contribute to peace and security in the SCS and the wider Indo-Pacific. In essence, the Enhanced Strategic Partnership is more than a bilateral achievement: it is a statement in support of ASEAN’s centrality, international law and a stable regional order having positive impact far beyond Southeast Asia.
Disclaimer
Views expressed above are the author’s own.
