The Kiratpur–Manali four-lane highway was promoted as an engineering marvel that would reduce travel time, boost tourism, and accelerate economic development in Himachal Pradesh. Instead, it is increasingly becoming an example of how poorly conceived infrastructure in the fragile Himalayan terrain can destroy both public finances and the environment. 

The 113-km Kiratpur–Nerchowk section alone cost nearly Rs 4,500 crore, translating to almost Rs 40 crore per kilometre—several times the cost of constructing a four-lane highway in the plains. Yet, despite this enormous investment, the highway continues to witness recurring landslides, slope failures, tunnel instability, and prolonged traffic disruptions. 

The economic burden does not end with construction. In 2026, the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) approved an additional Rs 825 crore solely for the restoration and stabilisation of the Kiratpur–Manali corridor. Geological investigations identified 44 critical landslide and erosion locations requiring long-term engineering interventions. In effect, taxpayers are paying twice—first to build the highway and then to keep it from collapsing. 

Even before this, NHAI had initiated separate slope-protection and geological investigation projects for vulnerable stretches between Kiratpur, Pandoh, and Manali, implicitly acknowledging that the original engineering design underestimated the Himalayan terrain. 

The indirect economic losses are even larger. 

Every major closure of the highway during the tourist season results in: 

• Thousands of stranded tourists. 

• Delayed movement of horticultural produce, especially apples and vegetables. 

• Higher freight and logistics costs. 

• Fuel wastage due to long traffic jams. 

• Reduced hotel occupancy and tourism revenues. 

• Repeated diversion of scarce public funds towards emergency restoration instead of new development projects. 

After the devastating floods and cloudbursts, several stretches of the highway were washed away, forcing NHAI to undertake emergency reconstruction at multiple locations merely to restore connectivity. 

The environmental costs are equally staggering. Massive hill cutting, indiscriminate dumping of excavated debris into the Beas river system, destruction of forests, and destabilisation of mountain slopes have increased disaster risks across the region. Illegal muck dumping has continued despite judicial intervention, threatening reservoirs, aquatic ecosystems, and downstream communities. 

This project therefore represents a classic case of negative asset creation. Instead of creating a durable national asset, it has created a perpetual maintenance liability. Economists describe such infrastructure as one with a very high life-cycle cost, where annual maintenance and disaster-repair expenses continue to escalate, sharply reducing the economic rate of return. 

The Himalayas cannot be engineered as extensions of the Indo-Gangetic plains. Every kilometre of unnecessary hill cutting increases the probability of future expenditure on retaining walls, rock bolting, drainage systems, debris clearance, and reconstruction. 

India certainly needs better Himalayan connectivity—but not at the cost of ecological instability and an endless financial drain. The future lies in climate-resilient engineering, rigorous geological investigations, minimal hill cutting, scientific muck disposal, ropeways, modern public transport, and context-specific mobility solutions. 

The Kiratpur–Manali highway should serve as a national lesson: infrastructure that demands hundreds of crores for repeated repairs is not an asset—it is a liability. Development that weakens mountains while weakening public finances cannot be called sustainable development. 

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